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At the end of 1997 five transition countries – the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia – were invit-
ed to start negotiations on their accession to the EU. Three
other countries – Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia – may still join
the first group. Two other countries – Bulgaria and Romania –
have concluded free trade and association treaties with the EU
and have less clear accession perspectives, as their transition
performance has lagged behind the frontrunners. 
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the
main macroeconomic and fiscal challenges that may appear
during the accession process, and indeed post-accession.
Attention will be concentrated on fiscal problems, since fiscal
performance plays a crucial role in determining of macroeco-
nomic balances. At the same time, it also often reflects the
progress achieved in structural and institutional reforms. 
The paper summarizes the results of the comparative ACE-
PHARE research project on "Medium and Long-Term Per-
spectives of Fiscal Adjustment of Selected Central European
Countries" (P96-6089-R), which covered four Central Euro-
pean countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania. 
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1. Introduction
At the end of 1997 five transition countries – the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia – were
invited to start negotiations on their accession to the EU.
Three other countries – Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia –
may still join the first group. Two other countries – Bulgaria
and Romania – have concluded free trade and association
treaties with the EU and have less clear accession perspec-
tives, as their transition performance has lagged behind the
frontrunners. 
Until now (i.e. spring of 1999) accession negotiations
have concentrated on various institutional, legal, and micro-
economic issues. The macroeconomic problems of candi-
date countries have not been discussed extensively as yet,
and it is not clear what kind of macroeconomic criteria will
be finally applied as conditions of membership. Most
researchers and analysts while discussing the macroeco-
nomic perspectives of candidate countries traditionally refer
to the five criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty. However,
these were formally binding only on the first group of the
EMU candidates and will not be automatically applied to the
new EU members [see Kosterna, 1998, p. 10]. Moreover, as
we shall see below, these criteria are not necessarily always
relevant to the specificities of the macroeconomic situation
of candidate countries. 
The above does not mean that the candidate countries
will not face serious macroeconomic and fiscal challenges or
that these problems will not complicate the accession
process. At the moment, this issue is overshadowed by the
negotiations relating to the legal harmonization process and
the restructuring of certain sensitive sectors. Assessing the
macroeconomic situation of candidate countries using the
Maastricht criteria gives the erroneous impression that they
are already close to fulfilling the requirements of EMU
membership, and will not experience serious problems with
macroeconomic convergence. In addition, too frequent
acknowledgement of the leading position of some countries
in the transition process (particularly of Hungary or Poland)
does not also help them face the scale and nature of possi-
ble difficulties. 
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of
the main macroeconomic and fiscal challenges that may
appear during the accession process, and indeed post-acces-
sion. Attention will be concentrated on fiscal problems,
since fiscal performance plays a crucial role in determining
of macroeconomic balances. At the same time, it also often
reflects the progress achieved in structural and institutional
reforms. 
To this end, the paper will summarize the results of the
comparative ACE-PHARE research project on "Medium and
Long-Term Perspectives of Fiscal Adjustment of Selected
Central European Countries" (P96-6089-R), which covered
four Central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, and Romania [1]. The first three are already
involved in accession negotiations and are widely considered
as leaders of the post-communist transition process, while
Romania has still to complete the first stage of transition,
and its EU accession perspectives are as yet unclear. 
Our analysis will start from the differences in GDP per
capita between the CEECs and EU member countries, rel-
ative growth performance, and growth prospects (section
2). Then we will turn to problems of financing growth, i.e.
the savings-investment gap, capital inflows, and current
account deficits (section 3). This will be followed by an
analysis of monetary and exchange rate policies and inflation
performance (section 4). Fiscal policy may play an important
role in supporting the disinflation process, mitigating exces-
sive current account deficits, and creating favorable condi-
tions for economic growth. At first glance, the current fiscal
situation of the countries analyzed does not look bad
(though it is differentiated), but there are a number of prob-
lems that are not reflected in the standard cash-basis fiscal
statistics. Examples are the implicit pension debt or contin-
gent liabilities in the banking system (section 5). Moreover,
the medium and long-term fiscal perspectives of the coun-
tries analyzed depend strongly on the expected rate of GDP
growth, and under a low growth scenario, they are very bad
indeed. The accession process itself will also influence both
the expenditure and revenue sides of the applicants' bud-
gets. This means that a further fiscal adjustment may be
needed in order to meet these challenges (section 6). Such
an approach leads us to a more detailed analysis of some
aspects of both revenue and expenditure policies, and also
of institutional reforms which determine the expenditure
side of the budget (section 7). Finally, we will try to specify
possible strategies for dealing with the problems identified
(section 8). 
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[1] The summary nature of this paper means that I will extensively draw from a number of other papers prepared under the same research pro-
ject by its participants: Stanislaw Gomulka, Urszula Kosterna, Georges de Menil, Peter Mihalyi, Jacek Rostowski, and Pavel Stepanek (project partners),
and Max Gillman, Michal Gorzelak, Piotr Jaworski, Wojciech Maliszewski, Jaroslaw Neneman, Ryszard Petru, Ondrej Schneider, Joanna Siwinska, Marek
Styczeñ, Magdalena Tomczynska, Zoltan Vajda, Mateusz Walewski, and Katarzyna Zawalinska (research assistants). The mentioned papers relate either
to problems of specific country or analyze certain problems from the cross-country comparative perspective. The contribution of individual authors
will be noted and acknowledged. In addition, Atilla Hajos and Monica Iosif helped us to collect data on Hungary and Romania. Miroslaw Gronicki pro-
vided the econometric consultation. Stanislaw Gomulka and Jacek Rostowski helped author with final version of this paper. However, author accepts
sole responsibility for the content and quality of this paper.
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2. Is catching-up to EU national income
levels likely?
Former communist countries lost at least a half-century
of normal economic development. The nature of their
growth built serious structural distortions into their
economies, which made them highly inefficient, compared
to the rest of the world. This led to an unavoidable output
decline after the collapse of communism [see Gomulka,
1998]. According to the simulation of Fischer, Sahay, and
Vegh (1998a), GDP per capita in the six Central and East
European countries, i.e., Bulgaria, former Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and former Yugoslavia, would
have been at least three times higher on average by 1992, if
they had continued the capitalist way of development after
WWII. Making up for this lost time will take at least 15 years
in the case of the Czech Republic, 20 years in the case of
Hungary and Poland, and 30 years in the case of Romania. 
Table 1 illustrates the 1995 per capita GDP level of the
candidate countries calculated in PPP terms and compares
it with the average GDP per capita level of three lowest
income countries in the EU, i.e. Greece, Portugal, and
Spain. The gap ranges from 74% of the average EU level in
the case of Lithuania to 30.1% in the case of the Czech
Republic. 
After a few years of output decline, the countries, which
were more advanced in the transition process returned to
economic growth, when first set of necessary market
reforms began to bear fruit. However, the rate of growth
has been uneven, as is demonstrated in Table 2. 
So far, Poland has presented the best cumulative growth
record. However, one must take into consideration that
Poland was the first country to start comprehensive eco-
nomic reforms (at the end of 1989) and the first to over-
come the output decline (in 1992). Among countries which
began transition somewhat later Slovakia, Slovenia, and the
three Baltic countries can also be classified as fast growing
countries. Hungary, starting its transition very early, was
surprisingly a slow growing country until 1996, partly as a
result of the 1994–1995 macroeconomic crisis. The Czech
Republic, another reform leader recorded only one year of
fast growth (1995), while 1998–1999 has brought a return
of output decline. Again, the macroeconomic crisis of 1997
seems to be at least a partial explanation for this phenome-
non. Romania started its economic growth relatively early
(1993), in spite of very limited progress in macroeconomic
stabilization and microeconomic restructuring at that time.
This "premature recovery" led to a macroeconomic crisis in 
1996–1997, which turned into a serious recession in
1997–1999. The same happened with the Bulgarian growth
experience of 1994–1995, which ended with one of the
most severe financial crises in the whole transition and a
deep output decline in 1996–1997. Due to a very tough
reform program, Bulgaria seems to have returned to eco-
nomic growth, as is reflected by its 1998 results. 
Explaining the "transformation recession" and the subse-
quent recovery and growth, as well as their differentiation
across countries is no easy task [see Gomulka, 1998]. Rela-
tively short time series, of not necessarily good quality, and
inherent difficulties in measuring various qualitative factors
influencing growth behavior, make any econometric analysis
quite risky. However, most attempts [2] have come to the
following conclusions: 
1. The size and length of the initial transformation out-
put decline [3] was determined both by the size of accumu-
lated macro- and microeconomic distortions, and by the
transition policy pursued by governments. 
2. During the recovery, the conventional determinants,
i.e. investment, labor, and human capital accumulation,
played only a limited role. The reallocation of existing
resources as result of elimination of previous distortions
(e.g. price and trade liberalization) seems to have been
much more important. Thus, uncharacteristically of other
depressions, macroeconomic stabilization, and progress in
structural and institutional reforms usually emerge as the
most important factors determining growth performance. 
3. External trade shocks and political shocks also seri-
ously influenced growth, at least in the short run. Among
many such impulses, one can mention the succession of
Balkan conflicts or the financial crisis in Russia and other CIS
countries in 1998 (which affected Poland and the Baltics in
1998–1999). 
4. Once the initial recovery is completed, further
growth will probably be determined, to a greater extent
than before, by conventional determinants, i.e. investment,
labor, and human capital. 
This last conclusion brings us to the problem of the
growth prospects of the candidate countries. There is a
widespread expectation that these economies will grow
faster than the current EU members, gradually closing the
development gap. The first obvious argument supporting
such an expectation is based on the well know convergence
hypothesis: countries with lower initial GDP per capita usu-
ally grow faster, other things being equal, than countries
with higher GDP per capita level [see Barro and Sala-I-Mar-
tin, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1996]. 
Rostowski (1999) gives a number of additional argu-
ments connected with the expected continuation of eco
CASE Reports No. 26
[2] Among the latest ones see e.g. De Melo, Denizer, Gelb and Tenev (1997), Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1998b), Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van
Rooden (1998), IMF (1998a). All these exercises base on the theoretical foundation of the contemporary endogenous growth theory.  
[3] It should be noted that the size of this decline has been usually overestimated for many methodological reasons. Overestimation of the initial
GDP level, underestimation of the unofficial sector rapidly expanding during transition, difficulties with estimating quality changes are the most fre-
quent statistical problems observed in individual countries. 
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nomic reforms. EU candidate countries will probably be fast
growing for the following reasons:
1. They have stopped pursuing the very bad economic
policies, which they had in the past under central planning
(pervasive government control, extensive subsidies, massive
foreign trade distortions, etc.). 
2. The existence of considerable gains from learning by
doing within the institutional infrastructure of the market
economy, which was initially non-existent (e.g. the bank-
ruptcy courts, customs services, and financial institutions),
which can be expected to continue for some time to come. 
3. New structural reforms which are coming on stream
(e.g. pensions' reform, privatization of utilities).
4. Expected benefits of EU and EMU membership.
In the light of the earlier discussion of the sources of
early post-transition recovery, one needs to ask to what
extent these potential sources of growth have already been
used up (particularly the first two factors). Visual inspection
of Table 2 does confirm the feasibility of the fast growth
hypothesis (at a rate of at least 4–5%) though there is no
guarantee that such a high rate will be sustained through the
whole of the next decade. Among the first group of candi-
dates, the Czech Republic seems the most problematic.
Among the remaining five countries, Romania appears to be
in the most dramatic situation. 
Using 1995 GDP per capita PPP based data, Fischer,
Sahay and Vegh (1998a) tried to forecast the future average
rates of growth of the CEE countries basing on Barro (1991)
and Levine and Renelt (1992) growth equations. They also
estimated the number of years needed by each country for
convergence to the average level of per capita GDP of the
three lowest income EU countries (Spain, Portugal and
Greece), assuming that the latter will grow at an average
annual rate of 2%. Results are presented in Table 3. 
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this sim-
ulation. First, growth rates in the range of 5–7% seem to be
a realistic forecast [4]. Thus, the fast growth hypothesis may
be taken as a reasonable assumption for projecting other
macroeconomic and fiscal variables. However, such an opti-
mistic scenario strongly depends on further progress in eco-
nomic reforms and sound economic policy. Second, even
the fast growth scenario does not give prospects of fast con-
vergence, even to the lowest-income EU countries. In the
best case (that of the Czech Republic), according to Barro
equation catch-up will take 11 years, in the worst cases
(Lithuania, Romania) – more than 30 years. Such a long last-
ing convergence may create many economic, social, and
political problems, which may themselves complicate the
accession process. 
Growth prospects have important implications for other
macroeconomic variables and policies. The fast growth 
hypothesis implies, for example, strong pressure for real
appreciation and expanding current account deficits on the
one hand (see next section), but on the other it also gives
much more room for maneuver in the fiscal policy sphere
(see section 6). A slow growth scenario makes balance of
payments problems less acute, but seriously challenges the
sustainability of the long-term fiscal position of candidate
countries. 
3. Balance of payments problems
A fast growth scenario in the candidate countries (far
faster than the UE itself) will lead to continuous real appre-
ciation of national currencies and widening current account
deficits. These phenomena can be explained from at least
three theoretical points of view: 
1. The investment-saving imbalance (balance of pay-
ments identity). 
2. Consumption smoothing models.
3. Real appreciation coming from the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson (H-B-S) effect.
Focussing on the investment-saving imbalance, a high
growth scenario may require an increasing investment to
GDP ratio as non-investment sources of growth (improving
X-efficiency and the efficiency of factor allocation) have
been substantially exploited in the first stage of the post-
transition recovery in a number of countries. Table 4 pre-
sents the investment and saving data for eight candidate
countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Both indicators are
highly differentiated across the countries, which may partly
reflect measurement problems. However, some interesting
observations can be drawn from this table as well as from
Table 5, which records current account balances of the ten
candidate countries. 
Apart from Bulgaria and Slovenia, the candidate coun-
tries record in 1997 insufficient savings (relatively to invest-
ment) and, as a result, current account deficits. Moreover, in
almost all countries significant deterioration of the current
account balance can be observed from the mid 1990s. In
1997 in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovakia current account deficits exceeded in
the 5% of GDP level, which is usually considered as the
threshold indicating external vulnerability. 
Apart from the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia,
the gross domestic investment to GDP ratio seems to be
too low to permit the fast growth scenario [5]. Mediter-
ranean countries (Portugal, Spain and Greece) during their
accession process to the EU and just after accession record
CASE Reports No. 26
[4] Table 3 contains forecasted rates of growth of GDP per capita. If we assume some population growth it will give a higher GDP growth rates. 
[5] We do not have opportunity to analyze effectiveness of the existing investment spending. We can only suspect that in countries less advanced
in transition process, particularly delayed in microeconomic restructuring at least part of estimated investment spending can be of very low efficiency. 
ed gross investment rates of about 30–35% of GDP [Jaku-
biak, 1999]. This may indicate the scale of investment
growth to be expected in the candidate countries in the
coming decade. 
The current investment boom in some candidate coun-
tries may support the above hypothesis. For example, in
both Poland and Slovakia real gross fixed investment has
increased at an average annual rate of 20% during
1995–1997, and in Poland the rate of increase has acceler-
ated in each successive year [EBRD, 1998, p. 223]. 
Increasing gross domestic investment to GDP will need
increases in either gross domestic saving or in the current
account deficit. Gross domestic saving rates to GDP are
determined by number of policy and institutional factors,
many of them historical (for example, high inflation
episodes, or financial crises in the past). One may expect
that continuing disinflation, further development of the
financial sector, and the introduction of funded pension sys-
tems, will push up the savings rate. Nevertheless, increasing
the savings rate is likely to be a very gradual process, condi-
tional on a number of developments [see Liberda and
Tokarski, 1999 for Poland]. Thus, further widening of cur-
rent account deficits due to the import of foreign savings
seems to be unavoidable in most countries. 
Importing foreign savings, i.e. capital inflow, also has its
own supply side dynamics. There are a number of "supply
factors" inducing capital inflows, which are likely to be pre-
sent in the applicant countries [Rostowski, 1999]:
– Consequences of H-B-S effect (see below). Increased
productivity in the tradable goods sector and increased rel-
ative prices in non-tradables lead to an increased return on
capital in both sectors in the fast growing country. 
– Progressive liberalization of capital flows in candidate
countries. 
– Increased maturity of the institutional infrastructure
will strengthen creditors' property rights and exit possibili-
ties for shareholders [6]. The prospect of imminent EU
membership can be expected to raise foreign investors'
awareness of the progress, which has been made in this
regard. 
However, massive inflows of foreign savings, even if pro-
voked by supply side factors, may crowd out part of domes-
tic savings. This can happen through the interest rate chan-
nel: other things being equal, capital inflows put downward
pressure on interest rates discouraging domestic savings. 
Likely, saving behavior can be also assessed from the
intertemporal consumption smoothing perspective. People
who expect to be richer in the future than they are at pre-
sent will behave rationally if they smooth their consumption
path by borrowing today in order to consume more now,
and repaying their debt later. At the level of a whole coun-
try this leads to foreign borrowing (capital inflow) and a cur-
rent account deficit [Rostowski, 1999]. 
Finally, the H-B-S effect leading to continuous real
appreciation of candidate countries' currencies should be
discussed. Although H-B-S effect itself does not lead to
worsening current account positions, as real appreciation of
the domestic currency is matched by productivity gains [7],
it can provoke other phenomena causing increased saving-
investment imbalance [see Rostowski, 1999]. First, real
appreciation means that national income measured in for-
eign currency rises faster than when it is measured in
domestic currency. As a result, the command of domestic
residents over foreign resources increases faster than indi-
cated by the growth of real GDP at domestic prices (in
which the inflation in the non-tradables sector is discount-
ed). This higher than conventionally measured real growth
justifies more smoothing of consumption, and a higher cur-
rent account deficit than otherwise. Second, if a large part
of the government's debt is denominated in foreign curren-
cy (as is the case in many transition countries) then real
appreciation leads to a decline in the ratio of public debt to
GDP, and therefore of the ratio of public debt to the poten-
tial tax base [see Siwinska, 1999a]. Even if Ricardian equiva-
lence is only partial, residents can be supposed to expect a
lower share of taxes in national income will be needed to
service the existing public debt. This raises future disposable
income and the desire to smooth consumption (and raise
the current account deficit) along with it. Third, from the
perspective of foreign investors, high expected growth
rates and real appreciation in applicant countries means
increasing asset values. This may induce a further inflow of
capital to buy while the assets are still relatively cheap,
worsening current account balance. 
Why is the problem of avoiding "excessive" current
account deficits so important for the macroeconomic policy
of candidate countries? If transition economies have the
possibility of importing additional savings that contribute to
a higher rate of economic growth, why reject such an
opportunity by restricting the current account deficit? Part
of the answer has been already given: the "appreciation –
capital inflow" bubble, secondly there is possible inefficient
use of imported saving if domestic absorption capacities are
inadequate. The history of the former communist countries
and of developing countries gives many examples of the
wasteful use of imported saving. The availability of cheap
foreign financing can also discourage some countries from
the fiscal adjustment effort required (a negative political 
11
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[6] In the presence of limited liability and asymmetric information in the provision of finance, there is increased risk to lenders as leverage increas-
es, so that only part of the current account deficit can be financed through the accumulation of foreign debt by the private sector. The rest is financed
by foreign direct investment (FDI). 
[7] The H-B-S in transition economies was empirically analyzed by Halpern and Wyplosz (1995). For other empirical research see also Halpern
(1996) and Maliszewska (1998). 
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economy effect). However, the potential unsustainability of
a large current account deficit, and the unpleasant conse-
quences of a sudden reversal of capital flows, is the most
serious problem. 
Rostowski (1999) points out the danger of a "capital
inflow – real appreciation" bubble, with the real exchange
rate rising ever more above its medium term equilibrium
level [8] until, finally, the bubble bursts, causing a currency
crisis and sometimes also a banking crisis. Sudden capital
outflows and thus sharp pressure for devaluation can be also
caused by external factors, such as a financial crisis in a
neighboring country or rapidly worsening sentiment on the
international financial markets. In any case, sharp devalua-
tion may have serious negative consequences: it can under-
mine the solvency of the domestic banking and corporate
sectors, increase burden of external debt service (both pub-
lic and private), provoke a new wave of inflation, stop eco-
nomic growth for a number of years, and seriously hurts a
government's credibility. All these consequences could
reduce the EU accession prospects of a country affected. 
What kind of policies can help avoid "excessive" current
account deficits and the danger of balance of payments
crises? The answer is not easy. First, deciding on what is the
sustainable level of the current account deficit seems an
impossible task, particularly for very small open economies.
Second, there is the problem of the absence of effective pol-
icy tools for keeping the current account deficit at the
desired level. 
In some of the transition economies (Hungary, Poland,
and Slovenia) monetary and exchange rate policies have
been used to try to prevent excessive real appreciation and
deterioration of the current account balance (see next sec-
tion). However, this has led to a softening anti-inflationary
policy and has involved significant fiscal costs [see D¹brows-
ki et al., 1999], while the positive effects on the current
account have been rather doubtful. Defending the exchange
rate against nominal appreciation (or alternatively a reluc-
tance to slow down the pace of nominal depreciation) could
not prevent real appreciation through higher inflation or
solve the problem of the fundamental saving-investment
imbalance. As capital accounts of transition countries are
being progressively liberalized, monetary policy will become
even more ineffective for targeting the current account
position [see Rostowski, 1999]. 
Fiscal tightening seems at first sight to be the other avail-
able measure keeping the current account position under
control [see e.g. Rybiñski and Szczurek, 1998]. Although fis-
cal adjustment, is, without any doubt, very desirable from
the point of view of the medium and long term fiscal sus-
tainability of candidate countries (see section 6), it may not
improve their current account positions as a "crowding in"
phenomenon may well take place [see Rostowski, 1999]:
improving fiscal balances will improve candidate countries'
financial rating (decreasing country risk) and encourage
more private capital inflow, which has to be balanced by a
larger deficit on the current account. 
Continuation of microeconomic and regulatory reforms
may contribute to marginally decreasing demand for exter-
nal financing on the part of financial and corporate sectors
not exposed sufficiently until now to hard budget con-
straints [9]. Again, though positive from the point of view of
avoiding the insolvency of part of the banking and corporate
sectors (and the possible contingent fiscal consequences), it
is unlikely that such developments will improve current
account positions significantly. 
The danger of balance of payment crisis could be elimi-
nated through a radical change of the monetary regime, i.e.
by the country's giving up its independent monetary policy.
This can either take the form of a currency board, or full
substitution of the national currency by one of the main
world currencies (in the case of EU applicant countries the
euro is the most natural choice). 
So far, three of the EU candidate countries, i.e. Estonia,
Lithuania, and Bulgaria have introduced currency board
arrangements, and have accomplished remarkable macro-
economic stabilizations. The very high current account
deficits of Estonia and Lithuania (see Table 5), with no signs
of serious speculative attacks against their currencies even
during the August 1998 Russian crisis, show how effective
currency boards can be in resolving the problem of balance
of payment vulnerability. 
A currency board regime has a fiscal advantage over the
adoption of another country's currency: it allows the reten-
tion of seigniorage revenue. However, it can be still subject
to speculative attacks, which is no longer the case once the
domestic currency has been abolished (a new domestic cur-
rency would have to be created if the country concerned
wished to leave the eurozone). Experience of attacks
against the Argentinian peso after the Mexican and Asian cri-
sis shows that it is not merely a hypothetical danger. 
This is reason why recently the idea of total substitution
of the domestic currency by one of the major international
currencies has enjoyed an increasing popularity. A "dollariza-
tion" proposal for Argentina [see Hanke and Schuler, 1999]
got the biggest publicity. Bratkowski and Rostowski (1999a,
1999b) proposed the idea of unilateral "euroization" for
Poland, even before membership of the EU. Robert Mundell
(1999) suggests either unilateral euroization or a currency
board based on the euro as an attractive option for all the
EU candidate countries. The authors concerned stress the
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[9] It relates, for example, to big state owned banks or big infrastructure monopolies such as railways, energy producers and suppliers, etc. 
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following benefits: (i) importing low inflation, (ii) importing
low interest rates, and (iii) importing the scarcity relation-
ships from the EU countries. 
Certainly, giving up monetary independence will not
totally eliminate the problem of sudden capital outflow
provoked, for example, by bad economic policy, deterio-
ration of the fiscal position or unfavorable political devel-
opments. Such an outflow may cause, among other things,
a stock market crash, contraction in the real sector and
increased unemployment. However, some of the reasons
for possible sudden capital outflow (a current account
deficit perceived as "excessive", expectation of changes in
exchange rates, limited credibility of domestic monetary
policy, etc.) will no longer exist, and the country con-
cerned should be able to enjoy the benefits of greater
macroeconomic predictability and stability as well as lower
international transaction costs. 
On the other hand, the exchange rate will no longer
serve as a shock absorber, or as a mechanism compensat-
ing for various microeconomic rigidities, particularly in the
field of income policy. This may create pressure for the
real sector to increase its flexibility. Since such a change in
microeconomic behavior needs time, moving to a fixed
exchange rate regime will probably cause some temporary
output and employment costs. However, there are at least
three serious arguments in favor of moving in this direc-
tion. First, the macroeconomic performance of Estonia
shows that giving up independent monetary policy com-
bined with tough fiscal discipline and fast microeconomic
reforms can create very good foundations for sustainable
economic growth. Second, and more fundamentally, the
relation between macroeconomic policy and microeco-
nomic reforms is that "...the former shifts around the burden
of the problem while the latter solves the problem" [Gillman,
1999]. If an economy suffers microeconomic distortions
(e.g. labor market rigidities), the first best solution is to
eliminate these distortions, while attempts to compensate
for them through macroeconomic policy clearly amounts
to a second best solution. Thus, the complete elimination
of the exchange rate mechanism as an accommodative
mechanism may force economic agents into greater flexi-
bility (as they cannot expect accommodative devaluation
anymore), and may force governments to accelerate
microeconomic reforms. Third, the first group of five can-
didate countries can be expected to join the third stage of
EMU (adoption of the euro) in the relatively near future
(at the latest by 2010), so the adjustment discussed above
is unavoidable. Speeding up accession to the eurozone can
bring them not only efficiency gains in the medium and
long run, and eliminate the risk of balance of payments cri-
sis in the meantime, but it also helps them avoid what is
likely to be a very difficult and painful period of ERM-II
membership [Bratkowski, and Rostowski, 1999a and
1999b].
4. Disinflation, monetary and exchange
rate policies 
In 1998 eight of the ten candidate countries found them-
selves with single digit inflation, while Hungary was a bit
above the10% threshold and Romania remained still in the
zone of high inflation (see Table 6). Only Bulgaria, Lithuania
and Latvia were close to the euro zone countries recent
performance (1-1.5% in 1998) while Estonia and Slovenia
were next in this ranking. All other countries have still a
quite long way to converge to the euro zone inflation per-
formance and to meet Maastricht inflation criterion (i.e.
inflation not exceeding the average of the three best per-
formers within EMU +1.5 percentage points). In addition,
it is necessary to note that strong deflationary trends on the
international oil and other basic commodities markets con-
tributed significantly to impressive disinflation progress in all
countries recorded in Table 6. As this deflationary trend is
being reversed in the course of 1999 the question of how
sustainable the disinflation achieved in 1998 is remains
open. 
Looking back into all the transition period, only the
three Baltic countries show a fast and continuous trend of
disinflation from the hyperinflation of 1992 to the low one
digit level, close to that of the EU. Poland also started from
near-hyperinflation in the second half of 1989 and followed
a continuous disinflation path. However, the speed of Polish
disinflation has not been as impressive and its current level
is higher than that of the Baltic countries. On the other
extreme, Hungary never had 12 consecutive months' infla-
tion higher than 35% but it had not manage to decrease CPI
inflation below 18% by the end of 1997. The Czech Repub-
lic and Slovakia experienced relatively limited and short
lived inflation jumps resulting from price liberalization (in
1991 end of year inflation reached 52.0% in the Czech
Republic and of 58.3% in Slovakia). From 1994 until the end
of 1997, the 12-month inflation rate stabilized around 8-
10% in the Czech Republic and 6–7% in Slovakia. A similar
situation can be observed in Slovenia. Only 1998 brought
more substantial disinflation in these four countries, but it is
not yet clear whether the low inflation level be sustained
given the reversal of price trends on the world commodities
markets. Bulgaria and Romania have become examples of
several stabilization failures due to weak monetary and fis-
cal policies, and an inability to impose the hard budget con-
straints on large enterprises and commercial banks. Bulgar-
ia seems to have finally learned from its mistakes, has intro-
duced a currency board regime in 1997, balanced its budget
and accelerated the pace of microeconomic reforms, while
Romania continues balancing on the verge of financial crisis.  
The slow pace of disinflation in the Central European
countries, which are the most advanced in the transition
process, can be explained by the generally accommodative
CASE Reports No. 26
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character of their monetary policies. In Hungary and Poland
(until the end of 1997) central banks have regularly
financed fiscal deficits (Table 7). This has also happened,
at least occasionally, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Additionally, the National Bank of Hungary was deeply
involved in quasi-fiscal operations (see Table 8), con-
nected mainly with servicing public foreign debt on
behalf of government. 
Exchange rate policies oriented towards export pro-
motion and current account targeting, rather than sup-
porting disinflation have been another part of this story.
This has been the case formally in Poland and Hungary,
which have used a pre-announced crawling peg devalua-
tion regime and in Slovenia, which has done the same in
less formal way. Such an orientation of exchange rate
policy not only deprives a small open economy of the
most effective anti-inflationary anchor [see D¹browski et
al., 1999; Antczak and Górski, 1998] but also causes seri-
ous complications in controlling the money supply.
Struggling against market pressure for nominal apprecia-
tion (or at least for slower depreciation than induced by
the crawling peg/crawling band mechanism) the central
bank must regularly purchase foreign exchange. In order
to avoid uncontrolled growth of money aggregates cen-
tral bank interventions on the forex market must be
heavily sterilized by decreases in the net domestic assets
of the central bank. This reduces the level of reserve
money but involves significant fiscal and quasi-fiscal
costs. The frequent appearance of negative signs in the
net value of quasi-fiscal operations for Poland and Slove-
nia (see Table 8) indirectly reflect the size of their cen-
tral banks' involvement in defending the exchange rate
against appreciation through sterilization operations. 
The slow and opportunist disinflation policies we
have noted in most CEE countries have given hardly any
benefits in term of better growth performance. On the
contrary, empirical research related to transition
economies [see e.g. Chrostoffersen and Doyle, 1998;
Gillman, 1999] confirm the negative correlation between
inflation and growth, as does research conducted on
broader groups of countries [see e.g. Gosh, and Phillips,
1998]. 
In the light of the above analysis, monetary policy of
some of the candidate countries should be seriously
modified. Crawling peg/crawling band mechanisms
which continue in operation in Hungary, and in much
more liberalized version in Poland, are evidently incon-
sistent with the expected EU membership criteria. They
also delay the perspective of inflation convergence, as
they multiply inflationary consequences of the H-B-S
effect. It seems very unlikely that candidate countries
will be allowed to continue this administratively orches-
trated competitive devaluation. Indeed, on accession,
the applicants will be probably asked to peg their
exchange rates to euro under the ERM-II mechanism. 
However, even an early abandonment of the crawling
devaluation mechanisms does not solve the problem of
internal inconsistency of the Maastricht convergence cri-
teria: a fixed exchange rate (or early adoption of euro in
the candidate countries as suggested in the previous sec-
tion) remains in conflict with the inflation convergence
criterion (i.e. inflation not exceeding 1.5 percentage
points the average of the three best EMU performers),
as a result of the expected much faster growth rate in
the candidate countries than in the core EU countries
(see section 2) and the H-B-S effect [Rostowski, 1999;
see also Halpern and Nemenyi, 1999, for Hungary] [10].
In fact, this kind of inconsistency is already observed in
the case of fast growing EMU members (Ireland, Spain). 
Solving this dilemma can go in one of two opposite
directions. The first would give priority to inflation con-
vergence, delaying the date of the ultimate fixing the
exchange rates of the candidate countries in relation to
euro and, therefore, their EMU membership (and inter-
est rate convergence). This variant implies nominal
exchange rate appreciation with all the political costs
and balance of payment risks connected with such a sce-
nario [see Rostowski, 1999]. Moving in this direction will
require a truly independent central bank able both polit-
ically and technically to pursue consistent disinflation tar-
geting and build a strong anti-inflationary reputation. The
second solution would be to go ahead with EMU mem-
bership, giving up the inflation convergence criterion
after the ultimate fixing of candidate countries' exchange
rates to the euro. Taking into consideration all the argu-
ments, including balance of payment challenges dis-
cussed in the previous section, the second option seems
to be more promising for the candidate countries
growth prospects and overall macroeconomic stability. A
slightly higher inflation in some regions of the common
currency area, if only caused by the productivity differ-
entials (the H-B-S effect), should not undermine the
credibility of macroeconomic policy, the propensity of
the population of these regions to save (here the intro-
duction of the euro will have much bigger positive
importance than any possible negative impact of a mod-
est inflation differential), or investment/growth
prospects. 
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violating the inflation convergence criterion will be actual if the growth rate difference will be higher than 3 percentage points. 
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5. Fiscal outlook at the beginning of the
accession process 
5.1. Fiscal imbalances and public debt
Fiscal adjustment was one of the most difficult and
painful components of the transition process, reflecting in
fact progress achieved in economic reforms and the quality
of policy conducted during the transition period in individ-
ual countries [see D¹browski, 1998]. Table 9 gives a gener-
al overview of the fiscal performance of the candidate coun-
tries.
The fiscal situation of the candidate countries is quite
differentiated. Estonia and Slovenia record general govern-
ment balances fluctuating around zero. Latvia recorded a
substantial fiscal deficit early on, and subsequently improved
its fiscal position achieving general government surplus in
1997. The Czech Republic and Poland represented moder-
ate, stable levels of general government deficits in the range
of 1–3% of GDP. Slovakia, generally belonging to moderate
deficit group, recorded more volatility and deteriorating fis-
cal balances in 1997–1998. Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and
Romania [11] represented high general government deficits,
reflecting serious difficulties with fiscal adjustment. The first
two have improved their fiscal performance in 1997–1998
[12], while Romanian fiscal disequilibrium remains severe.
Lithuania, after improving general government fiscal posi-
tion in 1997 deteriorated it again in 1998. 
While the fiscal position of general government illus-
trates current flow imbalances, public debt statistics (Table
10) show the extent to which past imbalances have accu-
mulated and what is a room for maneuver for fiscal policy in
the future. 
Individual countries started the transition with very dif-
ferent levels of public debt. Romania and Czechoslovakia
had practically none. Bulgaria, Hungary, the former
Yugoslavia, and Poland were heavily indebted, while the for-
mer USSR had a moderate level of indebtedness. After the
collapse of the USRR, all of its foreign assets and liabilities
were taken over by Russia (the so-called zero option). All
other FSU countries, including the Baltic states started their
independent existence with no debt. In the case of the for-
mer Yugoslavia, however, the principles of succession to
former national debt are not fully yet agreed. Poland and
Bulgaria were beneficiaries of large foreign debt reductions. 
Hence, individual countries have differing scope for fur-
ther expansion of public debt. Bulgaria presents the most
dramatic case. Despite 46% debt reduction from the Lon-
don Club in July 1994 the total public debt still exceeded the
level of 100% of GDP. Although Romania started the transi-
tion process with zero public debt, later it increased quite
dramatically, particularly in 1996–1997. Latvia and Estonia
have managed to keep their public debt close to zero.
Lithuania, on the other hand, shows a strong upward trend
in public debt/GDP, though the level remains relatively low
as yet. Slovenia has a moderate, though steadily growing,
level of public indebtedness. 
The comparative study by Siwiñska (1999a) gives a more
detailed picture of the public debt structure and dynamics
of four CEE countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania [13]. Hungary and Poland, which
entered the transition period with the largest debt burden,
have managed to substantially lower their debt to GDP
ratios. The improvement in the Hungarian debt ratio can be
attributed to the conduct of fiscal policy, that resulted in pri-
mary surpluses, as well as to the inflow of non-debt deficit
financing, mainly privatization receipts. The fall in the public
debt ratio in Hungary was also due to a high nominal growth
rate of GDP which was greater than the interest rate on
public debt, which resulted in the economy "outgrowing"
the debt. In the case of Poland the improvement can be
assigned mainly to the external debt reduction, which was
the result of the agreements with the Paris and London
Clubs. Other important factors were also the high rate of
real GDP growth and the real appreciation of the zloty.
Both resulted in a phenomenon that has also occurred in
Hungary, namely, that the nominal rate of GDP growth was
bigger than interest payments on the debt. Romania has
experienced an increase in the debt/GDP ratio, although its
indebtedness is still lower than that of Hungary and Poland.
The debt build up has occurred since 1994, and was espe-
cially strong in 1996 and 1997. The chief reasons are the
high fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit combined with a contrac-
tion of GDP. 
The structure of the debt of the four countries analyzed
has also undergone major changes. In the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland, the share of foreign debt has fallen in
favor of domestic debt. In Romania on the contrary, the
share of foreign debt has substantially increased. The shift to
market financing has resulted in a growing share of securi-
ties in domestic debt financing, and progress in the devel-
opment of public debt markets and the growing credibility
of governments has allowed lengthening bond maturities. 
Although the debt ratios of Hungary and Poland are
falling and both countries display primary surpluses, and the
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[11] In the case of Romania, official fiscal statistics does not cover the quasi-fiscal operations of the National Bank of Romania actively conducted
until 1996. For example, in 1996 general government deficit on the cash basis augmented by the fiscal deficit amounted to 6.5% of GDP instead of offi-
cially recorded 3.9% of GDP [Daianu, 1999].
[12] Bulgaria moved from high fiscal deficit (until 1996) to fiscal surplus position in 1998. 
[13] The remaining part of this subsection draws extensively from Siwinska (1998). 
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debt ratios of Czech Republic and Romania are relatively
low, each country faces hazards that threaten further fiscal
sustainability. Although the Czech Republic seems to be in
the best position among the four, the decline in its
debt/GDP ratio has been reversed since1997 due to deval-
uation of the koruna, GDP decline, and a significant loosen-
ing of fiscal policy [see Stepanek and Schneider, 1999]. Addi-
tionally, the Czech Republic, unlike Poland and Hungary, has
not as yet resolved the problem of bad debts in the banking
sector, therefore its true public indebtedness is seriously
underestimated (see below). 
Future fiscal developments in Hungary and Poland may
prove vulnerable to negative shocks. Both countries face
large interest payment obligations. In 1997, these reached
almost 4% of GDP for Poland, and  – 9% of GDP in Hun-
gary. They are likely to increase in future. These payments
are larger than the primary surpluses run by the govern-
ments of both countries, and therefore add to the debt
accumulation process. Any slowing of GDP growth may
cause the interest payments to outweigh the nominal GDP
increase, which may lead to a snowball effect of growing
debt-to-GDP ratio and interest payments (see next chap-
ter). Poland, although it has small interest payments at pre-
sent, will face an increasing debt service obligations after
2001 (as a consequence of the debt reduction agreements it
has signed). 
Superficial inspection of Tables 9 and 10 may suggest an
optimistic assessment of the prospects for the convergence
of the candidate countries on the EMU fiscal criteria as spec-
ified by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties (the so-
called Stability and Growth Pact). Apart from Hungary, the
other countries in the group of the first five candidates for-
mally meet both the deficit and the debt criteria for EMU
membership. However, such optimism may be premature
for many reasons. Some countries recently recorded a dete-
rioration of their current fiscal balances (for example, Czech
Republic and Slovakia). The level of fiscal redistribution is
excessive (see subsection 5.2). Implicit pension debts are
high where pension reform has not been implemented
(everywhere except Hungary and Poland!), and some coun-
tries (Czech Republic) additionally have large unrecorded
contingent fiscal liabilities (see subsection 5.3). Medium and
long-term fiscal prospects are uncertain (see section 6).
Additionally, the same ratio of the budget deficit and public
debt to GDP that is easily financed in developed countries is
not necessarily equally easily financed in transition
economies, due to their lower level of monetization, less
developed domestic financial markets and lower interna-
tional financial ratings [see Kosterna, 1998]. These draw-
backs can be probably removed only when applicant coun-
tries become members of the EMU.
5.2. High level of fiscal redistribution 
Table 9 also illustrates the generally high level of fiscal
redistribution of GDP in CEE transition countries. Looking
at the ratio of general government expenditure to GDP in
1997 one can distinguish: 
– A group of high spending countries (between 40 and
50% of GDP), which contains all of Central Europe – Hun-
gary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, and the Czech Republic. 
– A group of medium spending countries (between 30
and 40% of GDP), which contains the three Baltic countries
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Bulgaria [14] and Romania. 
According to "Wagner's law", the level of fiscal redistrib-
ution is positively related to the level of development. How-
ever, the general level of fiscal redistribution in the EU can-
didate countries is too high, in fact it is comparable with that
in current EU members, which have a much higher GDP per
capita. When Western European countries had the same
level of economic development as the most developed Cen-
tral European countries do today (some 30 years ago) their
general government expenditure to GDP ratio did not
exceed 30–35% [see Kosterna, 1998]. Similar (or even
lower) levels of fiscal redistribution can be observed at pre-
sent in Latin America, which has GDP per capita levels close
to those of Central Europe. 
The high share of government expenditure in GDP will
not stimulate economic growth in the long run, as it reduces
the rate of private saving available for investment financing.
This effect is particularly adverse in transition economies
where the rate of saving is rather low and government
expenditure is strongly dominated by consumption spending
(see below). The high tax rates needed to finance such large
public expenditures [15] hamper private business activity
and stimulate its outflow abroad (or to the shadow econo-
my). In effect, high taxes lead to the erosion of the tax base.
High social spending usually discourages legal employment
and distorts the labor market. High government expendi-
ture and revenues also create a temptation of discretionary
fiscal redistribution. This, in turn, leads to distortions in
resource allocation, tax evasion, intensive rent seeking, cor-
ruption, etc. Finally, the microeconomic effectiveness of
government spending is generally lower than that of private
spending. This relates both to consumption and investment
expenditures. 
Analyzing the structure of general government expendi-
ture one must note the role of overly generous social pro-
grams, particularly pension systems that are responsible for
the general over-expansion of government expenditures in
transition countries and the crowding out of such items as
public infrastructure investments. Table 11 shows the level
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[15] We assume that high expenditure level must be eventually financed by taxpayers. If country runs a fiscal deficit, the latter will have to be cov-
ered either by the inflation tax (immediately or with certain time lag), or by higher tax burden in future (necessary to finance public debt service). 
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of social security transfers and Table 12 – the size of public
pension expenditures representing a major component of
social transfers [16]. According to these data, only Lithuania
and Romania could still avoid the trap of the ‘premature
post-communist welfare state'. 
5.3. Hidden fiscal liabilities
Official fiscal statistics on a disbursement basis do not
necessarily cover all fiscal activities and the entire fiscal dis-
equilibrium of a country. An example is the restructuring of
bank and enterprise debt by issuing special government
bonds, as has occurred in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and
some other countries in the first half of 1990s. This
increased public debt and future fiscal burdens though it
was not reflected in the current budget composed on a dis-
bursement basis [17]. 
So-called contingent fiscal liabilities, in the form of
explicit and implicit public guarantees, constitute another
form of potential fiscal burden reflected neither in budget
deficits, nor in public debt statistics. As mentioned earlier,
this is particularly important in the Czech Republic. The
contingent fiscal liabilities in that country are estimated by
Stepanek and Schneider (1999) at 12.7% of GDP in 1998
(see Table 13), i.e. higher than the officially recorded pub-
lic debt. Furthermore, these liabilities are expected to
expand rapidly in future. These liabilities were built up
mainly in the process of isolating the bad debts of the bank-
ing and enterprise sectors and transferring them into special
financial institution such as the Consolidation Bank, the
Czech Encashment Corporation, and the Czech Financial
Corporation. Losses by the National Property Fund and
various kinds of credit, and export guarantees add to the
overall balance. 
Finally, implicit pension debt (unfunded pension liabili-
ties) should be added to the overall specification of fiscal lia-
bilities (see Table 14). Total implicit pension debt corre-
sponds to more than 200% of GDP in Romania. The equiv-
alent figures for Poland and Hungary before the pension
reforms in these two countries were more than 300% of
GDP in Poland, and more than 400% GDP in Hungary [see
Gomu³ka and Styczeñ, 1999] and Vajda, (1999). The implic-
it debt for those already retired turns out to be close to
100% of GDP in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Roma-
nia, but close to 200% of GDP in Poland. The main reason
for this difference is the unusually large number and size of
disability and survivors' pensions in Poland (see section 7). 
Comparison with the developed countries at the begin-
ning of 1990s [18] shows that the four Central European
countries analyzed are closer to the EU situation, rather
than to that of the UK, US and Japan, where the level of
implicit public debt is much lower. Poland and Hungary with
their extraordinary high pension liabilities are close to Italy
in 1990, while the Czech Republic's and Romania's obliga-
tions are similar to those of France and Germany. 
6. Medium and long-term fiscal
sustainability
Even the best current fiscal record can be misleading if it
cannot be sustained for a longer period of time. In the pre-
vious sections, we mention various possible vulnerabilities
and challenges facing candidate countries. In order to assess
the fiscal perspectives of the four countries until the end of
the next decade (year 2010) two different kinds of projec-
tions were prepared. The first [Maliszewski, 1998] starts
from the requirement that each country meet Maastricht
debt criterion (60% of GDP) [19] and estimates, under a
number of exogenous assumptions related mainly to growth
rates and interest rates, the primary fiscal balances required
to achieve this aim. The second [Gorzelak, 1999] projects
revenues and expenditures and checks whether these pri-
mary fiscal balances of Maliszewski are feasible.
6.1. Long term sustainability test
The first projection [20] is based on the assumption that
by the year 2010 the gross public debt to GDP ratio should
not exceed the current one for Czech Republic, Poland and
Romania and should be reduced to 60% in the case of Hun-
gary already in the year 2002. The purpose of the projection
was to find the primary fiscal balance consistent with this
debt to GDP target. The required primary surpluses have
been calculated according to the following formula:
–dt ≡ bt–1(rt–gt)(1+gt)–1+
b*t–1[(1+r*t)(1+at) – (1+gt)](1+gt)–1
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[16] It is important to note, however, that data presented in Table 12 may not be fully comparable due to a different tax treatment of the pension
benefits. For example, in the Czech Republic pensions are not subject to personal income tax [see Tomczyñska, 1999a], and this distorts comparison
with other countries. If taxes were applied, pension expenditure would be some 1.5% of GDP higher than officially reported [Gomulka, 1999]. 
[17] Markiewicz (1998) gives the extensive overview of different concepts and definitions of fiscal deficit.
[18] Since that time a number of OECD countries, for example Italy, carried out pension reforms that decreased burden of the implicit pension
debt recorded in Table 14. 
[19] The new Polish constitution of 1997 prohibits any actions, which could increase public debt to GDP ratio above the level of 60% [see Tom-
czyñska, 1999c]. 
[20] This subsection draws extensively from Maliszewski (1998). 
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where d is primary deficit to GDP ratio, b is the stock of
domestic debt to GDP ratio, b* is the stock of foreign debt
to GDP ratio, r is the real interest rate on domestic debt, r*
is the real interest rate on foreign debt, a is the rate of real
appreciation of domestic currency and g is real GDP
growth.
This method is a simplification of the usual approach to
the analysis of fiscal sustainability in developing countries out-
lined in Anand and van Wijnbergen (1989) or in Buiter (1997).
The main difference is that the budget identities of the Gov-
ernment (Treasury) and the Central Bank are not aggregated
into the single budget identity of the consolidated Govern-
ment. The Central Bank is not introduced into the analysis
since the contribution of the Bank's profits to Government
revenues is small and diminishing in the countries under inves-
tigation. Central Banks in advanced transition economies are
relatively independent, their main task is maintaining price
stability and their fiscal functions are limited.
The following assumptions were made in the projection: 
– Economic growth. For the 1998–1999 period the
Consensus forecasts were used for Hungary and Poland,
the Czech Ministry of Finance forecast were used for the
Czech Republic and the author's own forecasts were used
for Romania. For the remaining years two scenarios, one
with high growth (5% per year) and the other with
low growth (2% per year) for all countries have been
considered.
– Real foreign interest rates. As a large share of foreign
debt is denominated in US dollars foreign interest rates have
been assumed to be equal to interest rate on US Treasury
bonds plus a risk premium, which is different for each coun-
try. The real interest rate on US Treasury Bonds has been
assumed to be constant at the 3 per cent level, which is con-
sistent with a 5 per cent nominal interest rate and a 2 per
cent rate of inflation. Risk premia for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland have been projected to remain on their
October 1998 level, i.e. 1 percentage point for the Czech
Republic, 1.5 percentage points for Hungary and 2 percent-
age points for Poland. After accession to the EU and ERM-II
(in 2003 under the optimistic scenario and 2005 under the
pessimistic) risk premia are expected to drop to 50 basic
points and disappear completely after EMU accession (2005
under the optimistic and 2007 under the pessimistic
scenario). 
In the case of Romania, there were no grounds for
assuming any particular date of accession to the EU, and
therefore, 1998 situation has been extrapolated with a grad-
ually declining risk premium – 7 percentage points in 1998,
10 percentage points in 1999 and gradually declining (by
10% annually) afterwards.
As actual interest rate paid on the Polish foreign curren-
cy denominated debt is significantly lower than in other
countries due to a debt reduction agreement with the Paris
Club, the World Bank projection of the principal and inter-
est repayment until the year 2006 has been used. Thus, the
share of the low-interest debt is declining over the projec-
tion period and the new debt bas been assumed to be ser-
viced at the market interest rate (as discussed above).
– Real domestic interest rate. Domestic and foreign
determinants of the real interest rate have been identified,
where the domestic component has related to GDP growth
and the second element has been the real foreign interest
rate. The weight given to the domestic determinant was
assumed to decrease over time by one twentieth annually,
dropping to 0.3 after EU accession and later to zero after
EMU accession (with two variants of the accession date, as
above). The initial weights given to the domestic component
(0.3 for the Czech Republic, 0.5 for Hungary and Poland and
0.9 for Romania) has reflected the degree of integration of
each country with international financial markets. 
– Real appreciation of the exchange rate. In order to be
consistent with the H-B-S effect (see section 3) an elasticity
of the real exchange rate with respect to real GDP of 0.5
has been assumed. After joining the EMU, real appreciation
of exchange rate is determined by the accession criteria.
Since nominal exchange rates are fixed and the inflation
rate cannot be higher than the average rate of three "best
performers" by more than 1.5 per cent, we assume that
the real appreciation after joining the mechanism will be 1.5
per cent [21].
For domestic interested rates and real appreciation dif-
ferent assumption have been used for the Czech Republic
for 1998–1999 (forecasts of the Czech Ministry of Finance)
and for Romania for 1999 (author's own forecasts). 
Figures 1 to 4 show the simulation results for primary
deficits (-) or surpluses (+). 
The specific assumptions adopted for the 1998–1999
period have determined the results for the first years of the
projected period. The assumption of low GDP growth
explains initial primary surpluses in the Czech Republic. Sim-
ilarly, the initial high growth allows for primary deficits in
Poland and the expected strong real appreciation leads to
the 1998 primary deficit in Romania. Reduction of the debt
to GDP ratio in Hungary requires initial primary surpluses
despite the high growth forecast for 1998–1999.
In the high growth scenario, the primary deficits permit-
ted for the 2000–2010 period are similar for Hungary and
Poland. Paradoxically, they are higher than the deficits
allowed for the Czech Republic under the same assump-
tions. In the strategy of constant debt to GDP ratio, ana-
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lyzed here, gains from high growth and real appreciation are
proportionally greater when the debt/GDP ratio is higher.
Thus, keeping this ratio at the constant level constrains fis-
cal policy in the Czech Republic more than in the other
transition countries. However, the reverse is true for the
low growth scenario: the lower debt to GDP ratio requires
lower primary surpluses to keep it constant. Thus, in this
case the required surplus is lowest for the Czech Republic
(below 0.2 per cent of GDP) and the highest for the most
indebted country Hungary (about 0.65 per cent of GDP on
average). The difference between the low and high growth
scenario is the smallest for the Czech Republic (about 0.4
per cent of GDP) and significantly higher for Hungary and
Poland (about 2 per cent of GDP).
For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the per-
missible deficits are the highest (with the high growth) and
the required surpluses are the lowest (with the low growth)
when the process of European integration is accelerated.
Postponed accession to the ERM-II and to the EMU increas-
es the risk premium and drives up the domestic interest
rate (through the prolongation of the influence of the
domestic component). Because of higher costs of borrow-
ing, the resources required to keep the public debt to GDP
ratio constant also increase. However, the differences
between the early and late accession scenarios do not
exceed 0.5 per cent of GDP annually for Poland and Hun-
gary. The cumulated difference is also small: about 1.5 per
cent of GDP for Hungary and below 1 per cent for Poland.
For the Czech Republic, annual differences are negligible
and the cumulated difference is below 0.25 per cent of GDP.
Obviously, predicted gains from the accession crucially
depend on the assumption about interest rate convergence. 
The initial indebtedness of Romania is the lowest among
the four investigated countries. However, poor macroeco-
nomic performance and consequently very high-risk premi-
ums increase the costs of foreign debt service. Our assump-
tion of slowly decreasing spread makes the constant debt to
GDP ratio strategy difficult to implement, even under the
high growth assumption. The average primary surplus
required is about 1.5 per cent of GDP in the low growth
scenario and 0.5 per cent of GDP in the high growth sce-
nario respectively.
6.2. Revenue and expenditure projection
The purpose of the second projection was to check the
probability of countries achieving the fiscal performance
resulting from Maliszewski's (1998) projection. Gorzelak
(1999) simulation covers main elements of general govern-
ment revenues and expenditures, subject to the assumption
that no dramatic changes in their current proportions will
occur over the next decade. This provides a forecast of the
future streams of general government primary balances,
which is different for each country and for each scenario.
Then, these balances are used as inputs into the procedure
used by Maliszewski (1998), to calculate the debt/GDP
ratios for years up to 2010 [22], maintaining also Mal-
iszewski's assumptions regarding the two growth scenarios,
foreign and domestic real interest rates, and real apprecia-
tion of domestic currencies. 
The time horizon adopted – up to the year 2010 –
should be long enough to encompass the process of acces-
sion to the EU and EMU. Other great challenges that CEE
countries have to overcome – such as pension system and
health care reforms – should be already well advanced. The
forecast should also include post-accession events, such as
any major changes in the environmental policies of new
members, forced by the EU regulations [23]. 
Revenues and expenditures were split into main groups
(see Table 15). It has been generally assumed that in the
short term revenues depend on the overall performance of
the national economies (measured by the growth rate of
GDP), while expenditures tend to stay at some constant
real level. In other words, governments cannot reduce its
costs below some minimum level, while its revenues may
fall rapidly when the economy gets into crisis. During years
of growth, increase in production shifts up revenue (via
taxes), while expenditures do not necessarily have to be
increased.
Taxes are assumed to grow in the same rate as GDP,
with the exception of customs duties. The latter will fall to
zero after the accession, since there will be no taxation on
trade between EU members, while customs on external
trade will no longer be the revenue of the member states'
budgets. Until accession, customs duties are assumed to
maintain their real level, as a result of gradual decreases in
the level of duties in the pre-accession period (while the
volume of imports is assumed to continue growing).
All non-tax revenues are assumed to remain constant in
real terms. This item includes, for example, transfers from
the central bank, capital revenues and dividends. 
On the expenditure side, wages and salaries are also
expected to stay constant in real terms. This is another
hypothesis that may be doubtful, since economic growth
may provoke demands for increases in real wages. On the
other hand, however, ongoing privatization reduces the
army of workers paid by the state [24]. 
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[22] This subsection draws extensively from Gorzelak (1999). 
[23] The above concerns the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. As no forecasts about date of Romania's accession to EU and EMU can be made
at this moment, slightly different procedure has been used to assess development of Romanian debt/GDP ratio.
[24] An assumption of 1% annual growth of real wages in the low growth scenario, and 2% in the high growth scenario changes insignificantly pro-
jection results [see Gorzelak, 1999]. 
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The share of subsidies and transfers in GDP is expected
to remain stable. The same is assumed for investment and
other current expenditures. Interest payments have been
calculated using the same basic formula and the same
assumptions as in Maliszewski (1998). 
As it was discussed in section 5, state public pension
expenditures constitute the main elements of government
transfers. It is expected that reforms of the pension systems
will contribute to a decrease of these expenditures (as the
PAYG pillar will be downsized) but it will take many years
before saving will occur while the costs of reform will have
to be paid already in the coming decade. This brings us to
the problem of the extra costs of big "social" reforms and
the fiscal consequences of the EU accession process. 
The Czech Republic and Hungary have already imple-
mented health care reform. A similar process has just start-
ed in Poland. Both countries noted an increase in health care
expenditures, of about 2 per cent of GDP annually. One can
expect that similar expenditure increase will occur in
Poland. We have assumed that in the first 4 years of the
reform there will be an annual increase of expenditures
related to health care of 0.5% of GDP, after which a stable
additional burden of 2% of GDP must be added to budget
expenditures annually forever [see Mihalyi and Petru, 1999]. 
Pension system reform is being introduced in Hungary,
Poland, and Romania. According to Gomulka and Styczen
(1999) the Polish government will have to spend on average
1.7% of GDP each year (the cost of partial transition to the
second mandatory, fully funded pillar of the pension system).
A simplified estimation was used for Romania: the cost of
pension reform for Poland was adjusted taking into account
the difference in the ratio of current pension expenditures
to GDP in the two countries. For Hungary, an estimate pre-
pared by Vajda (1999) was adopted (see Table 16).
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will have to
increase their environmental expenditures, in order to fulfil EU
directives. It has been assumed that after EU accession envi-
ronmental expenditures will be doubled in these countries.
There may also be some additional government rev-
enues, resulting from the process of EU accession such as
EU transfers to candidate countries. Table 17 gives a pro-
jection of expected net EU transfers during the period ana-
lyzed based on the decisions of the Berlin EU summit in
March 1999 and Tomczynska's (1999b) estimates. 
Charts 5–12 present the results of Gorzelak's (1999)
simulation. While Maliszewski's (1998) results looked most-
ly optimistic, this exercise gives a gloomier picture. Even
under the high growth scenario, the development of the
debt to GDP ratio is rather pessimistic for the Czech
Republic [25] and Poland. Romania has the smallest costs of
reforms, so even the lack of EU transfers could not prevent
the ratio from falling. Hungary noted a small upward move-
ment of the debt to GDP ratio, followed by an (also small)
fall. Things look more dramatic in the low growth scenario
– rapid increases of debt to GDP ratios are visible in all
countries. 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania note high
primary deficits, together with visible increases of domestic
debt to GDP ratios (it is assumed that deficits are financed
domestically). Over the 10 years period, they will have to
cover additional expenses of up to 36 per cent of GDP, plus
interest on that. It therefore comes as no surprise that debt
to GDP ratios increase. 
The debt trend depends mostly on two factors. One of
them is the real GDP growth. In the high growth scenario
but without costs of reforms and EU transfers [see Gorze-
lak, 1999] all countries enjoy a decrease in their debt to
GDP ratio. When 2 per cent growth is assumed, the ratios
increase. The pace of this increase depends on the second
main factor: the initial debt burden. Hungary suffers from its
high initial debt to GDP ratio, having the slowest pace of
decrease of that ratio in the high growth scenario, and the
fastest debt increase if low growth is assumed.
Another main factor is the interest rate. Not all coun-
tries may take advantage of the same basic foreign interest
rates, because of presence of different risk premia. Romania
could achieve a much better debt to GDP ratio reduction, if
it did not face the highest risk premium.
When few assumptions have been changed (real appre-
ciation of 5 per cent annually in the high growth scenario
and 0 per cent in the low growth scenario, the new debt
may be also taken from external sources, higher domestic
interest rates in Romania) simulation results do not differ
substantially from the basic variant (with the costs of
reforms and EU transfers). Only in the high growth sce-
nario, the debt to GDP ratios look a little bit better than
under initial set of assumptions. 
In all variants, the situation of Romania seems to be very
good in this particular simulation. One cannot forget how-
ever that the real GDP growth rates were assumed to be
the same for all countries. Thus, it is rather doubtful
whether Romania could really achieve 5 per cent annual real
growth in the period up to 2010, as assumed – its economy
is in a worse state that of other CEE countries, and the tran-
sition process is not well advanced [see Daianu, 1999]. Also
other results should be treated with reservations, as many
of the assumptions adopted may not hold true.  
When costs of reforms were introduced into the analy-
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[25] Even more pessimistic fiscal perspectives for the Czech Republic in the next decade are forecasted by Ondrej Schneider [see Stepanek and
Schneider, 1999]. According to him, fiscal deficit in the Czech Republic may increase up to 5% of GDP, and public debt up to level of 50–65% of GDP.
This projection is basing on the extrapolation of the 1998–1999 fiscal performance and further relaxation of fiscal policy intended by the current Czech
government. 
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sis, three countries noted dramatic deteriorations in their
debt/GDP ratios even in the high growth scenario. The EU
transfers do decrease these additional costs, but cannot fully
compensate for them. This increase would mean that costs
of reforms should not be financed from additional borrow-
ing. In practice, either additional revenue should be found,
or other expenditures reduced. This is the most important
conclusion of Gorzelak's paper: all countries will be proba-
bly forced to make additional fiscal adjustments in the peri-
od up to 2010, and those will have to come mainly on the
expenditure side (as the ratio of total revenue to GDP is
already high). 
6.3. Fiscal challenges connected with the acces-
sion process
The simulation presented in the previous subsection
shows that scanty EU transfers to the candidate countries
will have probably very limited if any cushioning impact on
their fiscal situation. This makes the situation of the cur-
rent candidates very different from that of Mediterranean
countries fifteen or twenty years ago. In fact, the fiscal
burden connected with the accession process will be
probably greater than we assumed in the above projec-
tion. Some costs will have to be paid already in the pre-
accession period and these will not be limited to environ-
mental issues only as was assumed in our projection. The
additional expenditures will also be needed in public
investment (transportation and energy infrastructure),
public administration (for example, strengthening border
and customs controls on the new external EU borders,
improving the administration of justice, etc.). According
to World Bank (1997) estimates, Poland should spend an
additional 1.5% of GDP annually for infrastructure and
energy security purposes already in the period of
1998–2000. In addition, the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland must bear some costs connected with their NATO
membership. 
To make the picture even more complicated, the bal-
ance of fiscal flows connected with the adoption of the
Common Agriculture Policy in the candidate countries is
not as clear as is commonly supposed. According to
Zawalinska's (1999) estimation, the Czech Republic and
Poland may contribute more to the EU budget in the form
of the tariff revenue contributions than they will get from
the CAP in the form of export refunds (under the assump-
tion that the current trade structure of candidate countries
does not change). Only Hungary is certain to gain from the
CAP budget. 
Generally speaking, EU accession does not offer any
relaxation of fiscal constraints on the candidate coun-
tries. On the contrary, future EU membership seems an
expensive investment. Hopefully, this investment will
facilitate faster economic development in the next few
decades.
7. Review of some crucial expenditures
and revenues items
As fiscal adjustment in the four countries analyzed
seems to be unavoidable in order to maintain long-term fis-
cal sustainability, further analysis should concentrate on a
few key items of general government expenditures and rev-
enues. 
7.1. Public pension programs
As public pension expenditures constitute the biggest
transfer item in all candidate countries (as confirmed by the
statistical data presented in Table 12), we will start with this
area of government financial liabilities [26]. 
A comparative survey of pension systems in transition
countries [see Cangiano, Cottarelli and Cubeddu, 1998]
identified a number of 'stylised facts', which lead to the high
pension burdens observed: 
– Early retirement has reached a massive scale in most
countries, as the pension system was used to cushion the
effects of transition on open unemployment. 
– This use of the pension system was more common in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) than in the countries of
the FSU. It was also more common in countries where
restructuring was deeper and faster. 
– The system dependency ratio (the ratio between pen-
sioners and contributors) has been rising rapidly, reflecting
both decline in the number of contributors and growth of
the number of pensioners (see Table 18). The latter
reflects, among others, the extension of pension protection
to farmers.
– The fall in the number of contributors reflected rapid
growth of the informal economy and a large drop in total
output.
Despite these common features, developments in pen-
sion finances in individual countries have been remarkably
diverse. As can be seen from Table 18, this relates also to
the four countries analyzed. On the one hand, Poland
records an exceptionally high number of disability pension-
ers making Poland an outlier not only in Central and Eastern
Europe, but also worldwide [27]. Reform of the disability
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22
Marek D¹browski
pension system (tightening of eligibility criteria and elimina-
tion of the so-called third category of disability) which start-
ed in 1996 has not brought any visible results as yet. Addi-
tionally, Poland was the only country among the four where
the replacement rate significantly increased during transition
as a result of too generous indexation rules. Only in 1996
was wage indexation replaced by a mixed formula (price
indexation plus some arbitrary increase in real pension ben-
efits), and this has helped in decreasing somewhat the
replacement rate and the share of pension expenditure in
GDP, in 1997–1998. 
On the other hand, Romania represents an exceptional-
ly low replacement rate as a result of persistent high infla-
tion and only partial indexation. This replacement rate
makes Romania similar to the FSU and most of the OECD
[Chend and Jaeger, 1996; Table 6], but different from the
main EU countries: Germany, France and Italy, where
replacement rates are close to those of Hungary and Poland.
In addition, in Romania at the end of 1998 only about 46%
of the active population were covered by the social insur-
ance system as most farmers and people employed in the
informal sector remained out of the system [De Menil,
Hamayon, and Seitan, 1999]. This exceptional characteristic
of the Romanian economy (in comparison with other Cen-
tral European countries) may create a serious fiscal burden
in the future when an aging population not entitled to
receive pension benefits will need systematic social aid
financed from public sources. 
Unfavorable demographic trends in all of Europe, includ-
ing the four countries analyzed [see Schneider, 1999; Vajda,
1999; Styczeñ, 1999; De Menil, Hamayon, and Seitan, 1999]
will push up the dependency ratio, causing, other things
being equal, further deterioration of the PAYG system finan-
cial balance and a further increase in public pension expen-
diture as a proportion of GDP. 
The prospect of a demographically induced crisis of the
PAYG system has pushed most European countries to initi-
ate different types of pension reform to cushion the negative
fiscal effect of increasing dependency ratios. Among the four
countries analyzed, only the Czech Republic has not decid-
ed as yet to start a fundamental pension reform involving a
partial transition to a fully funded component. The threat of
making explicit a substantial part of the implicit pension debt
accumulated under the present system has served as the
main argument against starting a Hungarian/Polish type
reform [Schneider, 1999]. The Czech response to the
expected demographic challenge has concentrated on
changes in the PAYG system: a gradual increase in the retire-
ment age (see table 18), linking benefits more directly
to contributions, and adopting a price indexation formula
for pensions in order to lower the replacement rate
[Gomu³ka, 1999]. 
Nevertheless, these reforms seem to be insufficient and
the deficit of the PAYG system is expected to deteriorate
from 0.7% of GDP in 1999 to 1.5% of GDP in 2010 with
further deterioration after this date [Schneider, 1999].
Gomu³ka (1999) additionally points to the effects of the
1997–1999 recession and delayed enterprise restructuring
which may bring a sharp increase in the unemployment rate
and dependency ratio. 
The threat of serious macroeconomic crisis forced Hun-
gary to adopt a drastic stabilization program in 1995, and to
initiate comprehensive reform of the pension system. The
relevant legislation was adopted in July 1997. In January
1998, Hungary became the first transition country to start
implementation of a 3-pillar pension system. Poland fol-
lowed one year later, starting its comprehensive pension
reform on January 1, 1999. A similar reform is being pre-
pared in Romania. 
The motivations, aims and principles of pension reform
in all three countries have been very similar [see Gomulka,
1999; Palacios and Rocha, 1998; Gomulka and Styczen,
1999; De Menil, Hamayon, and Seitan, 1999] [28]. First, all
countries have the same fundamental flaws in the existing
pension system: low effective retirement age, excessively
liberal disability criteria, high replacement ratios, large redis-
tributive components in the pension formula and excessive
privileges for some categories of workers. Second, they
wanted to create a far tighter link between pension benefits
and pension contributions, thus strengthening the incentive
to work and the disincentive to evade (through drastic
reduction of the redistributive component and the estab-
lishment of individual accounts in the first pillar). Third, on
the macroeconomic front two major goals were: (i) bringing
down the aggregate level of public pension expenditures as
a proportion of GDP, and (ii) stimulate private savings
(through downsizing of the first pillar and development of
the second and third pillars). 
In practice, not all the above aims can be fully accom-
plished as reforms in Poland and Hungary are limited so far
to retirement pensions and in Poland only to those outside
agriculture. In Hungary these pensions account, in late
1990s, for some 80% of all pension expenditures, as against
some 55% in Poland [Gomu³ka, 1999]. Thus, the prospects
for lowering contributions clearly depend on progress in
reducing the burden of disability pensions, particularly in
Poland. 
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[27] However, other countries also recorded rapid increase in the number of disability pensions during transition. For example, in Romania the
number of invalidity pensioners was more than doubled between 1990 and 1998 [see De Menil, Hamayon, and Seitan, 1999]. 
[28] This is not surprising that both in Eastern and Western Europe countries with the biggest fiscal problems were the first to reform their PAYG
systems. 
As discussed in subsection 6.2 and illustrated in Table 16,
transition from the PAYG system to a fully funded second
pillar involves significant fiscal costs connected with the loss
of part of current pension contribution to the first pillar. On
the other hand, reduction in the current expenditure of the
first pillar will come very gradually, most likely after year
2010, i.e. beyond the horizon of our long term fiscal pro-
jection. 
Nevertheless, the reforms carried out in Hungary and
Poland (and planned in Romania) give the chance of avoid-
ing the worst case scenario, i.e. further, fast deterioration of
the PAYG financial balance which would happen in the
absence of radical changes (see above) [see Vajda, 1999;
Gomu³ka and Styczeñ, 1999; De Menil, Hamayon, and Sei-
tan, 1999]. 
According to Gomu³ka and Styczen's (1999) estimates,
the replacement rate in Poland under the old system (i.e. in
the absence of the 1999 reform) would decline, but would
nevertheless remain high, from 53% to 60% depending on
the indexation rule. The reform will push this rate down to
between 39% and 46% in 2040 (for the first and second pil-
lars together), again depending on the indexation rule.
For the first pillar (and it is this which is important for pub-
lic finances) the replacement rate will go down to 30%
in 2050. 
Under the reform, an initial fiscal deterioration in the
first pillar, by some 2% of GDP annually, is followed by a
gradual improvement, amounting to about 3% of GDP by
2050. In the absence of any reform, the initial deterioration,
also by about 2% of GDP, is followed by a further gradual
deterioration, amounting approximately to an additional
2% of GDP by 2050. This deterioration, by some 4% of
GDP during the first half of the 21st century, would bring
the budget deficit of the state pension systems outside agri-
culture in Poland to about 5% of GDP by the end of that
period. As the deficit of the agricultural pension fund is
about 2.5% of GDP, the total pension related deficit would
increase during next 50 year from about 3% to about 7.5%
of GDP. 
It is worth noticing, however, that not all the compo-
nents of the old age retirement pension system in Poland
are yet determined. This relates, in the first instance to early
retirement and other branch/professional privileges. These
were taken out the reformed system but not definitely abol-
ished. Some are supposed to continue under the separate
system of so-called "bridge" pensions, theoretically co-
financed by employers and government. In practice, they
will have to be financed mostly from the state budget as
they concern employees in loss-making state owned sec-
tors such as coal mining or railways. The range of profes-
sions covered by "bridge" pensions and their financing
schemes have not yet been decided and remain subject
to political bargaining. Additionally, new proposals for
early retirement or quasi-pension benefits in pre-retire-
ment are regularly demanded as a part of so-called
restructuring packages in politically sensitive industries.
In Hungary, reduction of pension expenditures in the
first pillar will be visible soon, mainly due to up-front elimi-
nation of various pension privileges. Assuming zero con-
tracting out from the first to the second pillar, the financial
balance of the PAYG system will gradually improve from a
small deficit at the end of the 1990s to a surplus exceeding
2% of GDP around the year 2014. Later on, this surplus will
gradually diminish, moving again into deficit after 2038, due
to unfavorable demographics. However, this deficit will be
much smaller than under no reform scenario. In the latter
case it would reach the level close to 6% of GDP in 2050
[Palacios and Rocha, 1998]. When we add the costs of par-
tial transition from the first to the second pillar (see Table
16), the first pillar will record a deficit of 1% of GDP at the
start of reform (1998–1999) with a continuous improve-
ment in the next decade and surplus around the year 2008
[Vajda, 1999]. 
Generally, fiscal constraints may push the countries ana-
lyzed, particularly Poland and the Czech Republic, to tight-
ening pension legislation related to the PAYG system fur-
ther. In the first instance, this should relate to eligibility cri-
teria for disability pensions (especially in Poland). The
retirement age, particularly for women, and branch/profes-
sional privileges are the other main fields for potential cuts. 
7.2. Health care
This is another major spending item exhibiting growth in
most European countries. There are many factors con-
tributing to this tendency: increase in GDP per capita, edu-
cation levels, demographic factors, technical progress, etc.
Increasing health expenditure need not necessarily give
gains in terms of higher life expectancy as their marginal effi-
ciency tends to decline [Mihalyi and Petru, 1999]. 
The demographic factor will probably play the most
important role in the coming decades. In fact, assuming that
most health expenditures are directed to eldest group of
the population and financing comes from contributions paid
by those currently employed, the logic of the financial
mechanism of public health care, its problems and dynamics
do not differ significantly from the PAYG pension system.
Hence, the expected aging of the population will put enor-
mous pressure on public health finances. As in the case of
the public pension system, health care issues create a con-
venient issue for populist politicians, which makes expendi-
ture cutting reforms very difficult. In addition, information
asymmetry and supplier induced demand for medical ser-
vices are serious obstacles in establishing effective costs
control mechanisms in any type of health system financed
from public sources [see Mihalyi and Petru, 1999]. Fast
technical progress also induces demand for new medical
equipment, technologies and medicines, which are usually
more expensive than the traditional ones. All these factors
23
Macroeconomic and Fiscal Challenges Facing Central European...
CASE Reports No. 26
24
Marek D¹browski
constitute a serious challenge to any system of public finances,
particularly in transition countries, which inherited many dis-
tortions in the health sector from the previous system. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the Czech Republic and
Hungary moved from a tax financed government controlled
system (involving also government responsibility for the
provision of medical services) to a Bismarckian type manda-
tory public health insurance system. Poland followed in
1999. This was done mainly under the pressure from the
doctors' lobby. There are serious doubts whether this is the
best choice from the fiscal point of view, as the system of
mandatory health insurance is usually more expensive than
the British type of tax financed system with additional pri-
vate provision of medical services on a competitive basis.
The countries mentioned have also started partial privatiza-
tion and commercialization of health care. 
The level of health expenditures in the three countries as
a proportion of GDP is still below Western European levels,
despite considerable growth in the Czech Republic and a
high initial level in Hungary (see Table 19). However, if their
GDP per capita levels are taken into account, the opposite
can be said: all three countries spend more on health than
OECD countries spent when their per capita GDP was at
similar levels [Mihalyi and Petru, 1999]. 
From a financial perspective, the health care reforms
have brought mixed results. In Hungary, health care expen-
ditures appear to have risen only moderately. The share of
health expenditures actually fell relative to GDP. This was a
result of the restructuring of the supply side: a 25%
decrease in the number of expensive hospital beds without
affecting patient care. Regional differences in care
decreased. The number of family practitioners increased
and their equipment improved with the majority of family
physicians working in the privatized system, which offers
better incentives [Mihalyi and Petru, 1999]. 
In the Czech Republic, on the contrary, insurance reform
and the privatization of a large part of provision were not
accompanied by adequate cost-containment measures. A
fee-for-service system together with privatization led to a
cost explosion (see Table 19). Ongoing increases in the
unemployment rate (see previous subsection) may addition-
ally worsen the financial situation of health insurance com-
panies in the Czech Republic. The supply side has been
restructured only somewhat – the number of hospital beds
has decreased by 10%.
So far, it is hard to assess the financial effects of the Pol-
ish reform. On the one hand, there are some institutional
solutions in the Polish system, such as wide prerogatives of
the Health Insurance Funds Supervisory Office, the lack of a
fee for service principle, the obligation of the health insur-
ance funds to have balanced budgets, which should facilitate
cost control [see Mihalyi and Petru, 1999]. On the other
hand, the very strong position and aggressiveness of trade
unions in the health sector, political populism, weakness of
the new institutional infrastructure, and delays in introduc-
tion of cost control instruments and methodologies will
push health expenditures up. In addition, the relatively low
level of public health spending in Poland compared to neigh-
boring countries means that the assumption made in sub-
section 6.2 regarding the gradual increase of this expendi-
ture seems to be justified. 
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that candidate
countries can hardly count on any decrease in the public
health expenditure to GDP ratio in the coming decade. The
realistic objective is to avoid an expansion of this expendi-
ture in relation to GDP (Czech Republic and Hungary) or
control the pace of this expansion (Poland). In terms of sug-
gested expenditure containing measures, obligatory co-pay-
ments for a broader set of medical services and increased
co-payment for medicines seem to be the most effective
solution. They could help to limit the excessive, very often
physician-induced demand for health services. However,
this proposal will certainly meet a strong political resistance,
especially when one takes into account the already existing
level of co-payments (see Table 20), particularly in Poland. 
7.3. Agriculture sector
In 1998 subsidies and expenditures related to agriculture
amounted to 1.3% of GDP in Hungary (without expendi-
tures for rural development), 1.2% of GDP in the Czech
Republic, and 2.8% of GDP in Poland (without tax exemp-
tions) [29]. However, calculating budget support on a per
capita basis Hungary takes the first place (1,712.8 EUR per
farmer in 1997) before the Czech Republic (1,491 EUR per
farmer), and Poland (821 EUR per farmer). This is due to
the very low share of agriculture in total employment in the
Czech Republic (4.1% in 1996), a bit higher in Hungary
(8.2%) and very high in Poland (26.7%) [Zawalinska, 1999]. 
The structure of budget support for agriculture varies
significantly between the three countries analyzed. In1998
price support amounted to 36% of the total budget expen-
ditures for agriculture in the Czech Republic, 35% in Hun-
gary and only 2% in Poland. In the Czech Republic the three
biggest items, i.e. price subsidies (36%), direct payments
(29%), and credit subsidies (23%) absorbed 88% of the
total agriculture budget. Hungary represented a very similar
spending pattern: 86% of the total expenditures was chan-
neled to price support (35%), interest rate subsidies and
other production subsidies (27%), and investment subsidies
(24%). In Poland transfers to the pension fund for farmers
amounted to 76% of the total budget allocation for agricul-
ture, while all other items played a less significant role. 
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The above short characterization shows that most agri-
cultural expenditure does not help to solve the long-term
structural problems of this sector. The Czech Republic and
Hungary try to follow the Common Agriculture Policy pat-
tern, which means building price, structural, and fiscal dis-
tortions into their economies. On the other hand, Poland's
budget has to support a too generous welfare system for
farmers where ca. 94% of total expenditures is financed
through budget transfers. However, reductions of agricul-
ture related spending in the candidate countries seems
rather unlikely, particularly in the pre-accession period as
the farmers lobby will push for more state support for this
sector following EU countries experience. 
7.4. Indirect taxation [30]
The basic VAT rates in four countries (the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) presented in Table 21
are relatively high – similar to the high rates observed in the
Nordic countries (see Table 22). Simultaneously, a relative-
ly broad range of goods and services are taxed at reduced
rate, exempted from VAT or taxed at zero rate, and tax
avoidance makes the effective VAT rate much lower (see
below). VAT preferences mean not only loses of budget
revenues, but also distortions in consumer choice and
resource allocation. 
Table 23 presents the map of preferential VAT treat-
ment in the four countries analyzed. The zero rate for some
domestically consumed goods and services is still in use in
Poland and Hungary, but these countries plan to abolish it
(in accordance with EU directives). The relatively wide
range of goods and services, which are zero rated in Poland
shows how difficult it is to stop preferential treatment, once
granted. 
The scope of exemptions is very similar among the four
countries. They include items, which are difficult to tax
(banking, insurance, finance, leasing, etc.) and social services
(education, health and social care, public utilities etc.). The
exemption of agriculture is probably temporary. 
Contrary to some OECD countries (such as Italy,
France, and Belgium), the four countries analyzed use only
two rates (standard and reduced). In Hungary and Romania
the differences between these two rates are smaller than in
Poland and especially than in the Czech Republic, which
means smaller distortions in consumer choice and resource
allocation. 
Foodstuffs are the main item preferentially taxed. Oth-
ers include pharmaceuticals, books and newspapers, public
transportation, fuel for heating (Romania), energy for
households (Hungary), accommodation services provided
by low category hotels and restaurants (Poland), construc-
tion materials and house construction services (Poland and
the Czech Republic – the latter in much more limited form). 
Theoretically, if all consumption were taxed at single
basic rate, and if there was no tax evasion, the share of VAT
revenue in GDP would not be much lower than the VAT
rate. Hence, the ratio of the VAT revenue as a share in GDP
to the basic rate illustrates the coverage and effectiveness of
this tax. A higher ratio reflects a smaller range of non-uni-
form taxation, VAT exemptions, and tax evasion. Usually
the share of VAT revenue in GDP is about 0.4 of the basic
rate. New Zealand has the best results in this respect: the
uniform rate of 12.5% gives a VAT revenues share in GDP
of 8.2% (the ratio of the tax rate and relative revenue is
therefore 1.5). The other extreme among OECD countries
is Italy, where a 19% basic rate gives of only VAT share of
5.6% of GDP (the analogous ratio is 3.4). 
Table 24 shows the very low effectiveness of Romanian
VAT. Rates of 18% and 9% (before 1998) yielded much less
revenue than similar rates in other countries. The reason
for such poor performance was a narrow tax base (it was
broadened in February 1998), tax arrears and a non-effi-
cient refunding procedure, which allowed massive fraud.
The relatively low VAT threshold also does not help to gen-
erate more revenue. The future will show whether the
Romanian fiscal authorities will manage to increase revenue
from VAT significantly as result of legislation introduced in
1998. 
The ratio of the basic rate to the share of VAT in GDP is
similar in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In Hun-
gary, after the reform of VAT in 1993 revenue soared. This
example shows that from the economic point of view the
best way to increase tax revenues is to enlarge the tax base.
Such a move brings additional revenues not only from newly
taxed goods, or goods taxed at a higher rate. Additional rev-
enues come also from increased consumption of the goods
taxed at a basic rate, which previously faced preferentially
taxed substitutes. 
Generally, VAT legislation in the four countries analyzed
presents continuos improvement, in spite of strong resis-
tance by various lobbies. The scope of VAT preferences is
being slowly reduced. Probably the Czech Republic has the
best VAT legislation among the four countries. The Czech
VAT has two shortcomings only: the big difference between
the basic rate and the reduced rate (17 percentage points)
and an extensive preferential treatment of services. Despite
an unfavorable overall macroeconomic situation and a very
unsatisfactory pace of system reforms in Romania, VAT leg-
islation in this country, especially after the changes intro-
duced in 1998, looks good: the difference between basic
and preferential rate is only 11 percentage points and the
list of preferentially treated goods has been substantially
limited. Evolution of the VAT in Poland and Hungary can
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also be assessed positively, although both require further
reduction of the scope of preferential treatment. 
Except for the preferential treatment of the construc-
tion materials and services in Poland and energy in Hungary,
the scope of preferential treatment matches the Sixth
Directive of the EC with the amendment of 19 October
1992, attachment H, specifying the list of goods and services
that can be taxed preferentially. To comply with EU regula-
tions Poland, Hungary and Romania will have to restrict the
zero-rate to exports only and shift construction materials
and services (Poland) and energy (Hungary) to a standard
rate and Romania will need to reduce the scope of exemp-
tions. Obviously full integration with the EU will require far
more changes in VAT legislation, but these will be rather of
a technical or legal character and will not have much eco-
nomic impact.
The scope of the excise duties in the four countries ana-
lyzed is very differentiated (see Table 25). Except for the
Czech Republic, excise is levied on a wide range of goods,
including goods other than those subject to common excise
duties within the EU ("sin" goods: mineral oils, alcohol and
alcoholic beverages, manufactured tobacco). Different ways
of tax measurements (unit, ad valorem or a combination) and
different currencies do not allow for precise analysis of the
tax rates. 
However, it is obvious that most excise tax revenues
come from the "sin" goods. This means that the excise for
the other goods could be abolished (as required by EU
directives [31]) at a very low cost in terms of revenue lost.
In some cases, revenue could even increase as many of
heavily taxed goods can be, and in fact are, purchased
abroad. The abolition of excise will lower or liquidate such
price differences and, as a result, these goods would be pur-
chased at home bringing increased VAT revenues.
The Czech excise system is the closest to that of the EU.
On the other hand, Romanian excise is very far from that of
the EU. Despite the long list of excise goods in Romania, tax
revenues (measured in comparison to VAT revenue) are
very low. In 1995, the revenues from VAT were 3.5 times
higher than from excise duties and one must remember that
VAT revenues are relatively small there. This ratio was
about 2 in the case of Hungary and about 1.7 in Poland and
the Czech Republic. In most EU countries this ratio varies
from 1.5 to 2. 
7.5. Direct taxation [32]
Hungary was the first country in Central and Eastern
Europe that introduced a market-oriented income tax sys-
tem. Personal income tax (PIT) was introduced in 1988,
while corporate income tax (CIT) was introduced in 1989.
In Poland PIT was implemented in 1992, replacing a number
of wage and income taxes, and CIT was first introduced in
1989. In Romania an individual wage tax was introduced in
1991, replacing the former wage tax based on the economy-
wide gross average wage. The wage tax in that country,
however, still suffers from important shortcomings, in par-
ticular, the complex rate schedule (14 tax brackets with
rates ranging from 5% to 60%) and the fact that the tax
only covers wages and salaries, while other income sources
are subject to different tax schedules. The last revision of
the profit tax was introduced on January 1, 1995 in Roma-
nia. The current Czech tax system of direct taxation was
introduced in January 1, 1993. 
In general, in the four countries analyzed PIT is progres-
sive. The pattern of PIT differs among them in detail,
regarding zero band/allowance, tax credit, marginal rates,
ceilings, and deductions. In 1998, tax rates ranged from
19% to 40% in Poland, from 15% to 40% in the Czech
Republic, from 20% to 42% in Hungary and from 5% to
60% in Romania. 
General income consolidation rules in Poland, Czech
Republic and Hungary are similar to those of the EU coun-
tries. Taxable income is understood as the sum of incomes
derived from varies sources (see Table 26). In the EU only
in Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal and Belgium are different
principles of income calculation applied. In most EU mem-
bers, all kinds of incomes are liable to personal income tax-
ation, including employment income, dividends, retirement
pensions, income from the sale of real estate and movables.
Among Central European countries analyzed, Poland has
the highest level of consolidation. At the other end of the
scale, Romania is still very close of the concept of wage tax
inherited from the command system. 
As Table 27 shows, the four countries analyzed have
reduced their highest marginal rates of PIT in the period of
1993-1998. Although all countries have moved in this direc-
tion, the Czech Republic has gone the farthest by reducing
the top marginal rate from 47% in 1993 to 40% in 1998.
The same tendency can be observed in most EU countries
(see Table 28). In the 1980s most of member countries cut
their top personal income tax rates by an average of over 10
percentage points. Since then, top rates have remained rel-
atively stable. The top individual tax rates in the countries
analyzed are comparable with the EU average level 45.6%.
In addition to cutting top marginal rates in the 1990s,
many EU countries have restructured the rate schedule in
order to reduce the number of tax rates. As a result the
average number of positive rates in personal income tax sys-
tems decreased from 10 to less than 6. The same tendency
is observed in the countries analyzed (see Table 29). In this
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respect, the Czech Republic (5 tax rates), Hungary (6) and
Romania (6) are comparable with such EU countries as Aus-
tria (5), Finland (6) and France (6). Poland, where 3 tax
brackets were introduced at the beginning of the tax reform
in 1992, is comparable with Denmark, Netherlands and
United Kingdom. Generally, the personal income tax
became a flatter tax, with fewer tax rates and smaller dif-
ferences between them. 
European legal regulations provide for the possibility of
tax allowances or tax credits. Only Germany, Italy and Por-
tugal do not apply tax credits, but at the same time they tax
incomes in the first tax bracket at the relatively low rate. In
Italy the first ceiling is taxed at 10% and in Portugal at 15%.
In the Central European group, the amount of tax credit is
extremely low in the case of Poland and Romania bringing
Poland close to a "flat tax". 
Some countries give an opportunity of joint taxation of
married couples, which can be an important relief for some
families. In the countries analyzed, such regulations exist
only in Poland. 
Corporate income tax rates differ among the four coun-
tries (see Table 30). In 1998, they amounted to 18% in
Hungary, 35% in the Czech Republic, 36% in Poland, and
38% in Romania. The rates were substantially reduced
between 1993 and 1998. This trend largely followed that of
the EU countries (see Table 31). Among the latter only Italy
and Spain did not reduce corporate income tax rates over
the period of 1986–1998. But their level is comparable with
current average rate for all EU member countries. Since the
mid-1980s, the cuts in CIT rates have averaged around 10
percentage points. The highest rates remain in Germany
(45/30%) and Greece (35/40%) and the lowest in Finland
(28%) and Sweden (28%). Hungary thus represents a com-
petitively low level of CIT. 
In order to have a complete picture of income taxation,
the high rates of social insurance contributions (payroll
taxes) should be taken into consideration. They usually
finance public pension expenditures including disability pen-
sions (see Table 18), unemployment benefits, sick leave,
health insurance, and some other items. 
In the period 1992–1996, revenues from direct taxes
(i.e. PIT and CIT) in relation to GDP decreased in each of
the countries analyzed with the exception of Poland. They
declined by 8.4 percentage points in the Czech Republic,
2.8 in Romania and 2.2 in Hungary. In 1995, the direct taxes
to GDP ratio in the Czech Republic (10.9%) and Romania
(10.8%) was well below the EU average (14.4% of GDP)
and was comparable with that of Austria (11.3%), Germany
(11.8%), Spain (10.0%) and Greece (9.1%). In Hungary,
this ratio (8.8%) was comparable with the lowest EU levels:
France (7.8%) and Portugal (8.9%). In Poland, revenues
from direct taxes have remained roughly at the same pro-
portion of GDP over the period analyzed. In 1996, total
direct taxes in Poland were estimated at 12.3% of GDP.
Romania obtains about half its total tax revenues from direct
taxes, whereas Poland relies on direct taxes for about one-
third of its total tax revenues. Hungary and the Czech
Republic obtain about a quarter of their total tax revenues
from direct taxes. 
In 1996, PIT yielded from 5.3% of GDP in the Czech
Republic to 9.2% of GDP in Poland (see Table 32). In
Poland, from 1992 to 1996, the share of personal income
tax in GDP increased from 7.7% to 9.2%. In this country,
the PIT burden was nearest to the EU average of 11.3%. In
the remaining three countries the personal income tax ratio
showed a slight tendency towards declining. In the Czech
Republic from 7.0% to 5.3% and in Hungary from 6.7% to
5.9%. The levels observed in these countries are the low-
est in comparison to the EU countries. They are compara-
ble with Greece (4.9%), Portugal (6.1%) and France
(6.2%). The average for the CE countries (6.9%) was less
than half that in Sweden (17.5%), Finland (16.2%), Belgium
(14.6%) and a quarter that in Denmark (27.6%) [33].
In the period of 1992–1996, the share of CIT revenue in
GDP decreased in all the countries analyzed, to the greatest
extent in the Czech Republic (see Table 33). Although in
the Czech Republic this ratio declined from 10.8% in 1992
to 4.1% in 1996 it was still the highest among the four
countries analyzed: 1.3 higher than in Poland and twice as
high as in Hungary. This last country represents an extreme-
ly low share of CIT revenues in GDP, even in the European
context. They dropped from 2.5% of GDP in 1992 to 1.9%
of GDP in 1996 and remained below the EU average of
2.9% of GDP. In 1996, the ratio of corporate tax to GDP
was estimated at 3.1% in Poland and 3.8% in Romania.
Such levels were comparable with Belgium (3.1%), Sweden
(3.1%), Netherlands (3.3%), United Kingdom (3.3%) and
Italy (3.6%) – the "high corporate tax revenue" EU coun-
tries. 
The extent of necessary adjustment of direct taxes reg-
ulations of the candidate countries to EU standards is much
narrower than in the case of indirect taxes as a consequence
of a relatively low level of legal harmonization in this sphere
in the EU itself. The acquis communautaire concerns mainly
some aspects of corporate taxes and capital flows (mergers,
divisions, transfers of assets and exchange of shares, taxa-
tion of parent companies and their subsidiaries, elimination
of double taxation).
Looking at potential opportunities for increasing budget
revenues one should rule out increasing income tax rates, as
they are already high. Further increases would only provoke
greater tax avoidance and flight of business activity to the
informal sector. Some reserves may lie in broadening tax
bases and in better tax administration. Another possibility is
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connected with a simplification of the tax system and flat-
tening tax progression. Starting from the observation that
higher marginal PIT rates and their steeper progression in
Hungary as compared to Poland is associated with lower
share of PIT revenues in GDP (see Tables 27 and 32),
Walewski [1999] found some evidence of a Laffer-like rela-
tionship in three Central European economies, i.e. in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Contrary to the orig-
inal Laffer curve idea, this relationship relates to the number
of tax rates (brackets), i.e. the steepness and complexity of
the PIT scale rather than to the level of the tax burden. A
smaller number of tax rates allows, other things being equal,
to collect more revenues. The second difference refers to
another transmission mechanism. In the original Laffer
model, high tax rates decreased the motivation to work and
to business activity, decreasing output, income, and thus, the
tax base. In transition economies, the Laffer type relation
seems to work mainly through the shadow economy chan-
nel: higher tax rates push entrepreneurs from the formal to
the informal sector. As integration of capital markets pro-
gresses, all the countries – including the transition ones –
will face increasing cross-border competition between
direct tax systems. Currently PIT rates in EU countries do
not seem to be competitive ones in comparison with the
candidate countries (see Tables 27 and 28) but one should
also take into account the high payroll taxes in the latter.
Moreover, if candidate countries want to grow faster than
the current EU members, and bring in more foreign invest-
ment, their tax systems should be much more attractive
than those in Western Europe, so as to compensate for their
relative institutional and infrastructural weaknesses. 
If the above hypothesis is right, attempts of the candi-
date countries to simplify their tax systems, limit PIT pro-
gression, and systematically decrease CIT rates seem to be
a good response to the above challenges. Estonia, which is
not in our comparative analysis, presents the most impres-
sive record in this respect. That country introduced, from
the very beginning of its transition process (in July 1992) a
single proportional rate of the PIT at 26% of a taxable
income [see Bauc, 1995]. The proposal for the comprehen-
sive PIT and CIT reform in Poland discussed in 1998–1999
(among others, lowering CIT rates, lowering and flattening
PIT rates, elimination of numerous exemptions in both
taxes) also goes in this direction. 
Experimenting with the Laffer curve idea in practice,
policymakers should remember, however, about two things.
First, as Walewski (1999) documents, this relation is not
very strong. Second, there is a certain time lag between
lowering (simplifying, flattening) tax rates and positive sup-
ply side effects. Therefore, one must expect some revenues
losses, particularly in the fiscal period immediately following
tax rates cuts unless these cuts are compensated by other
tax measures (broadening the tax base, increases in indirect
taxation). 
8. Concluding remarks
Central European and Baltic countries applying for EU
membership will face several serious macroeconomic and
fiscal challenges in the coming decade. Some of them result
from the unfortunate past: Central and Eastern Europe lost
half a century of normal capitalist development and must
now catch up with Western Europe. Intensive catching up
will create huge investment needs, and thus an investment-
saving imbalance, high current account deficits, and pressure
for appreciation of domestic currencies. The situation is fur-
ther complicated by an unfinished transition agenda and an
imperfect transition record in many countries. For example,
fiscal deficits additionally worsen investment-saving imbal-
ances, particularly in Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania. The
financial sector is underdeveloped and in some countries
(the Czech Republic) burdened with contingent liabilities,
which hampers mobilization of domestic savings. Inflation
still exceeds the Western European level, in some countries
by a substantial margin (Hungary, Poland). Monetary and
exchange rate policies in most countries in the first group of
candidates (apart from Estonia) have been oriented towards
accommodating fiscal imbalances, fine tuning growth, and
export promotion rather than to fighting inflation consis-
tently. Privatization, restructuring and market oriented insti-
tutional reforms are far from being finished (apart from
Hungary, which has mostly finished its privatization agenda).
The unfinished microeconomic agenda limits flexibility of
the supply side response to shocks and creates additional
sources of macroeconomic risk (for example, excessive bor-
rowing of large enterprises not exposed to hard budget con-
straints). 
Some contemporary challenges are common to all Euro-
pean countries or even to all countries around the world.
Globalization is the first on this list and it has far going con-
sequences for all aspects of life. Continuously increasing
competition relates not only to markets for goods and ser-
vices, but also to capital markets and (to a smaller extent) to
labor markets. Widespread liberalization of financial flows
enables economic agents to arbitrage between currencies,
tax and regulatory systems, various levels of property rights'
protection, legal infrastructure, levels of macroeconomic
and political risks, moving business activity, investments and
assets between countries or between currencies. This seri-
ously limits national sovereignty in all spheres, not only
those of economic policy but also of political life, raising
required criteria of economic and political responsibility.
This also relates to the question of small countries running
their own independent monetary systems and independent
monetary policies. 
Another long term challenge, common to most devel-
oped and transition countries is connected with population 
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aging, which has a serious negative impact on the financial
balance of the PAYG pension systems, health insurance sys-
tems, and some forms of social aid. In the much longer term
(going beyond the time horizon in this study of 2010) pop-
ulation aging will also negatively influence rate of private
saving and growth prospects. Only a radical liberalization of
immigration policies will be able to limit these adverse con-
sequences of population aging in developed countries, but
at present, such liberalization does not seem to be very
probable for political reasons. 
Environmental needs will also create pressure for
increased spending (including by government), particularly
in less developed countries, including the EU candidates
from Central and Eastern Europe. This pressure will exist
irrespective of their EU membership, though accession con-
ditions may call for faster adjustment in this field. 
The accession process itself means another serious
package of various reforms for the candidate countries with
a complexity similar to the first stage of transition at the
beginning of the 1990s. Many of these reforms will cost can-
didate countries taxpayers' money and only part of them
will be compensated by net official EU transfers. In fact,
looking at accession from the fiscal point of view it is a kind
of investment, which should be recovered thanks to more
stable economic, legal and political environments, better
infrastructure and institutions, higher quality of living stan-
dard, and therefore, better growth prospects. However,
how quickly this additional spending will be paid off remains
an open question and depends on the quality of the eco-
nomic systems and economic policy of the EU itself and of
its future members. 
The prospect of EU membership offers, however, a
unique chance for importing stable institutions, the new
common European currency, and credibility of economic
policies. The macroeconomic convergence criteria can also
help governments to carry out the necessary fiscal adjust-
ment measures, particularly those related to excessive
social transfers. All these factors should facilitate eliminating
a significant part of the macroeconomic fragility and exter-
nal risk connected with high current account deficits (as this
problem will mainly relate to interregional flows inside the
common currency area), unstable domestic currencies (as
they will cease to exist), high fiscal deficits (put under the
control of the Stability and Growth Pact), etc. The new
institutional and macroeconomic environment should facili-
tate stable and macroeconomically safe capital inflows, high
investment rates, and rapid growth. 
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